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Abstract: Earnings management and company life cycles are still interesting to be 
researched and discussed because there are many cases of fraud in large local companies 
and abroad. The financial scandals by management from year to year have proven to 
increase and it is an irony because the scandals were committed by financial manager of 
reputable companies. This study examined the relationship between the company life cycles 
on accruals earnings management and analyzed the internal control system to moderate the 
relationship between the company life cycles on accruals earnings management. This study 
used 502 data panel from Indonesian capital stock exchange in 2010- 2014. The result of 
this study: the company life cycles did not affect the accruals earnings management, but the 
internal control system was capable of lowering a positive effect of the company life cycles 
on earnings management. 
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Introduction 
Earnings management is a policy on management option accounting, or an activity 
that affects the real income so as to achieve some specific purpose of reporting 
income (Scott, 1997). Definition of earnings management is also provided by 
Healy (1985). He contends that earnings management is a behavior of  managers 
that use the policies of  financial reporting and structuring transactions to create 
financial reporting alternative to mislead stakeholders on the economic 
performance of companies or to influence the outcome contractual depending on 
the accounting numbers reported. Studies related to the accrual earnings 
management conducted by Dechow and Skinner (2000), found that motivation 
management makes the earnings management to achieve the expected bonus. 
Consistent to (Healy, 1986), Dechow and Skinner (2000), Balsam (1998), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found that the management of opportunistic act 
on earnings as they relate to compensation.  
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Earnings management and life cycles are still interesting to be researched and 
discussed because there are many cases of fraud in large local companies and 
abroad. The financial scandals by management from year to year are increase and 
that is ironic because scandals are done by financial manager of reputable 
companies. Anthony and Ramesh (1992) state that the change in sales growth and 
capital spending is a signal the company's strategy and the strategy of cost-
effectiveness, both as a function of the stage of the cycle. In the growth stage 
(growth), the characteristics of the company experienced strong sales growth, high 
liquidity and begin to pay dividends. At this stage, the company starts doing 
product development, so that the capital expenditures for research and development 
to be high. In the stage of maturity, the selling rate begins to decline, declining 
market share and the dividend payment is higher than the growth stage. In stage of 
decline, dividend payments begin to decline, and so did sales and capital 
expenditures. Researches dealing with the effect of the company life cycle on the 
earnings management have presented mixed results. Shiue et al. (2012), Bulan and 
Yan (2009) found that the life cycle affected the accrual earnings management, and 
real earnings management. Other researchers conducted by Anggraini (2007) as 
well as Addin and Jouyban (2012) found no difference of accruals earnings 
management between stages. Motivated by the diversity of the research above, this 
study intended to examine more deeply the other factors that could strengthen the 
influence of the life cycle of the company to earnings management. Earnings 
management will be implemented in a variety of life cycle can be controlled if the 
conditions of internal control is strong. Based on agency theory, management must 
be monitored and controlled to ensure that the management is performed with a full 
adherence to the rules and regulations and reports the economic activities in 
transparent and accountable manners.  
Review of Literature  
Agency Theory  
The agency problem relates to potential conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers in a company because of the separation between owners as principal 
and management as agent. Managers are expected to take action to guarantee the 
fulfillment of the best in the interests of shareholders because they always control 
the daily activity of management. The application of board structure of agency 
theory focuses on the control function. Jensen and Mekling (1976) write that 
agency theory puts the company as a contract interpreter of the various participants 
mutually transaction one another. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that 
Commissioners become an effective tool to monitor the management and to reduce 
the agency costs. Scott (1997) suggests that some parties involved in the business 
transaction have more information than the others, a condition that leads to so 
called asymmetric information. Asymmetry of information may include 
information that is distributed unevenly among agents and principals, and business 
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processes occurring at the agent cannot be observed directly by the principal. Once 
such phenomena have taken place, the agent will demonstrate dysfunctional 
behavior. One dysfunctional behavior demonstrated by the agent is managing data 
in the financial statements to comply with the expectations of the principal even 
though the report does not describe the actual condition of the company. One of the 
manipulations of data in the financial statements is the practice of earnings 
management. 
The Company Life Cycles 
Life cycle concept has been widely discussed. A company life cycle hypothesis is 
an extension of the concept of product life cycle in marketing (Rink and Swan, 
1979). Companies that are in the growth stage generally show higher sales growth 
than those in other stages. The companies have a larger amount of investment and 
dividends they pay is still low. Usually companies that are at the stage of growth 
are still relatively young age. Companies that are at the mature stage in general 
reflect the payment of dividends, sales growth, and the amount of investment at the 
medium level. The classification of the life cycle is done only in 3 stages: growth, 
mature and stagnant. The decline stage was not done because the company in this 
stage usually no longer listed on the stock exchange. According to Quinn and 
Cameron (1983) of some of the literature written about the life cycle of the 
company, none of the stage of decline, because in this stage company has 
metamorphosis and unpredictable. 
Internal Control System an Earnings Management  
The definition of internal control system by COSO is a process, effected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the objectives in the following 
categories: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations; (2) reliability of financial 
reporting; (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and (4) 
safeguarding of assets against unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition. 
Earnings management is a phenomenon that has been widely known, intended to 
manipulate reported earnings (increase or decrease) to meet various targets such as 
target fulfillment profit/loss of earnings management as a widespread phenomenon 
that aims to manipulation reported earnings. Earnings management based on 
(Healy, 1985): "the earnings management occurs when managers use policies in 
financial reporting and structuring transactions to create financial reporting 
alternative to mislead some stakeholders on the economic performance of 
companies or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on accounting 
numbers reported”.  
Dechow and Dichev (2002), Osma (2008) Cohen and Zarowin (2010) as well as 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) have shown the results of research conducted 
extensively about the motivation and the consequences of earnings management 
activities. Balsam (1998) as well as Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found 
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evidence managers raise or lower the profit to influence contractual outcomes. 
Subekti (2012) found that positive earnings around zero is indication of earnings 
managed to avoid negative earnings. 
Hypothesis Development 
Earnings Management and Company Life Cycles 
The company always faces the life cycles. Sabol et al. (2013) say, these stages 
occur in all companies and highly recognized by the management. Based on 
agency theory, management as an agent should face the company life cycle with 
a good performance. Previous studies on the effect of the company's life cycle on 
earnings management have provided mixed results. Research conducted by Shieu 
et al. (2012) confirms that the positive growth outlook relates to the accrual 
earnings management. Hastuti (2011) found that companies are at a critical point 
growth to mature and mature to stagnant chose discretionary accrual raise profit. 
Based on discussion above, this study hypothesized as follows: 
H1: The company life cycles have a positive effect on accrual earnings 
management. 
Internal Control System, Company Life Cycles and Earnings Management  
Hunziker (2013) states that a report internal control is the responsibility of the 
management. They should take care of internal control system properly and ensure 
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The company can 
develop strategies for presenting information on the internal control system with 
the present implementation of the internal control system as a monitoring tool. 
A good internal control system gives a signal of good corporate governance. This 
statement consistent with Suyono and Hariyanto (2012).  
Agency theory considers that management cannot be trusted to act in the best 
possible way for the benefit of the public and shareholders. Rests on agency theory, 
management must be monitored and controlled to ensure that the management is 
done with full adherence to the rules and regulations and reported in a transparent 
and accountable. The tighter the control system, the lower expected earnings 
management conducted, with strict implementation of internal control system 
within the company will be able to minimize the chance of earning management. 
Based on this argument, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H2: internal control system weakens the positive relationship company life cycles 
on accrual earnings management 
Research Methodology 
Population and Samples 
The population used in this research was manufacturing companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2010 - 2014.  
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The sample is part of the elements of the population Gujarati (2004). 
The secondary data used in this study were extracted from public sources, the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange website (www.idx.co.id). 
Model Research 
The model in Equation is used to test the hypothesis. 
AEMi,t=  γ0 + γ1cyclesi,t+ γ2SPIi,t +γ3sizei,t + γ4 cycles*SPIi,t + eit            (1) 
AEMi,t - accruals earnings management i in period t 
cyclesi,t  - company life cycles i in period t measured by combined four 
indicator (sales growth, dividend payout, company expenditure and age of 
firm) 
sizei,t - size of company i in period t measured by logarithm total asset 
Variables Measurement  
This research variables measurement is detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variables measurement 
No Variable Variable measurement 
1 Company 
life cycle 
The life cycle of companies classified in the growth, maturity and 
stagnant using procedures classify the company life cycles developed 
by Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and tested by Yan (2006) and Shiue 
et al. (2013). The classification procedure begins by calculating the 
descriptor of company life cycles with this equation: 
DPt  =  (DPSt/EPSt) x 100                                                                 (I) 
SGt    =   ((SALESt – SALES t-1))/SALES t-1) X 100                       (II) 
CEVt =  (CEt /VALUEt) X 100                                                      (III) 
AGEt =  YEARt – YEAR IN COMPANY LISTING                     (IV) 
DPTt - dividend payout firm i in year t; DPSt - dividends per share 
for the company i in year t; EPSt - earnings per share for the 
company i in year t 
SGit - sales growth (sales growth) firm i in year t ; SALESit - net sales 
firm i in year t; SALESit-1 - net sales firm i in year t-1; CEVt - capital 
expenditure value I in year t-1; CETt - capital expenditure in year t;  
VALUEt - equity market value (closing price x number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the year) plus the book value of long-term 
debt firm i at the end of t ; AGEt - age of the company, calculated by 
the yeart - in the year of company listing in Indonesian capital stock 
exchange 





Internal control system measured by instrument created by Deumes 
and Knechel (2008) and developed by Hunziker (2013): the 
instruments are consist 7 points of disclosure of internal control (a) 
Objective; (b) Responsibility; (c) Effectiveness; (d) Special element; 
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Result and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Based on Table 2, accruals earnings management occurred due to the change of the 
company's activities which represent the difference between profit and cash flows 
are derived from the company's operations and managerial policy. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistic of data 
 Accrual earnings management Company size 
Mean 342.905 5.333.665 
Maximum 7.415.000 8.379.000 
Minimum 9.721 130.000 
 
The smallest and the highest value is 97,21 and 7.415.000. Both of these values 
are positive, it means activity of earnings management is increasing income. 
Company size had a minimum value of 130.000, maximum value of 8.379.000, and 
mean value of 5.333.665. In other words, the samples were big companies. 
 
Table 3. Description of life cycle frequency 
Life cycles Frequency Percent 
Growth 324 64.5% 
Mature 173 34.5% 
Stagnant 5 1% 
 
Description of company life cycles based on Table 4, the majority of the samples 
were at the growth stage. There were 324 data of 502 or 64.5% of total company 
sample, the mature stage are 173 data or 34.5% and stagnant stage 5 data or 1%. 
 
Table 4. Description of internal control system frequency 
SPI_disclosure Frequency Percent 
1 94 18.7% 
2 111 22.1% 
3 119 23.7% 
4 92 18.3% 
5 71 14.1% 
6 15 3% 
7 0 0 
Total 502 100% 
 
(e) Limitations; (f) Monitoring  and (g) Internal audit for internal 
control. Measurement variable internal control system is the sum of 
the final total score above 
4 Size Measured by logarithm asset 
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The internal control system consisted of seven items of disclosure. Based on Table 
5 the majority of the disclosure of internal control systems were 3 points and 2 
points. There were 119 companies that disclosed 3 points of internal control system 
(23.7%) and 111 companies that disclosed 2 points of internal control system 
(22.1%). 
Hypotheses Test  
According to Table 5, value of F-statistic is 21.05 and significance at level 1%. 
The results show that the regression model: 
AEMi,t= γ0 + γ1cyclesi,t+ γ2SPIi,t +γ3sizei,t + γ4 cycles*SPIi,t + eit                       (2) 
is a fit model. The regression model can be used to predict earnings management 
accrual is based on the independent variables, namely company life cycles, internal 
control system and size as control variable. Adjusted R-squared = 13.8%. Its means 
the variation of accrual earnings management can be explained by variations in the 
company life cycle, the internal control structure and size of the company 13.8%. 
The t-statistic of the company life cycle was 0.04 and not significant. Therefore, 
the H1 was unacceptable. The company life cycle did not affect the accrual 
earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that strong evidence of 
earnings management occurs only when discussing about the management's efforts 
to report earnings at end of period to get the incentive. At the stage of the life cycle 
is different; it is difficult to believe that all the management has the same 
motivation at the same time. It is difficult to find unity of opinion in doing earnings 
management among management in one company. The t-statistic value of 
interaction life cycles and internal control system was -1.6936 and significant in 
level p<10%. Its mean suggesting H2 acceptable the internal control structure 
could weaken the positive influence of company life cycles on accrual earnings 
management. 
 
Tabel 5. Result on regression test 
Variable coefficient Std error t-statistic 
Life cycles -0.0426 0.0758 -0.5621 
ICS -0.0226 0.0469 -0.4811 
Cycles*ICS -0.0208 0.0123 -1.6936 † 
Size -0.3004 0.0338 -8.8819*** 
Intercept 1.7585 0.3351 5.2484*** 
Adjusted R2 = 0.138          F. test = 21.05*** 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
The implementation of internal control system allows the companies to control the 
management of opportunistic behavior in all conditions; especially in conditions 
the company experienced a stagnant and declining. This is reinforced by Hunziker 
(2013) who reported that the internal control is the responsibility of the 
management to do and take care of proper internal control system and management 
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must ensure the effectiveness of internal control over financial statement 
presentation. The company can develop strategies for presenting information on the 
internal control system by presenting the application of the internal control system 
as a monitoring tool, can also inform as a signal of good corporate governance. 
Presentation of the internal control system will increase the confidence of investors 
because it can reduce user uncertainty of financial statements regarding the quality 
of financial statements (Bronson et al., 2006). Agency theory explains that in two 
different interests between management as agent and principal owner of the 
company as necessary to have a system that is capable of bridging two interests to 
be reconciled. With the implementation of internal control system will be able to 
control the management of opportunistic behavior in all conditions, especially in 
conditions the company experienced a stagnant and declining life cycle. 
Management remains will defend its interests in a variety of ways, one of them 
earning management. Good control and supervision of the board of directors and 
the audit committee will be able to control the behavior of poor management and 
can maintain the interests of the owner of the company. 
Conclusion 
This study aimed to examine the effect of the company's life cycle and interaction 
of life cycle with internal control system to accruals earnings management. Internal 
control system in this study was treated as a moderating variable, the variable that 
could weaken the positive effect of the company life cycle and accrual earnings 
management. Based on the results of the research found that the life cycle did not 
affect the accrual earnings management, but the internal control system was 
capable of lowering a positive influence of company life cycles to earnings 
management. The implication of this research demonstrated that internal control 
system  weaken the positive influence of company life cycle to  accrual earnings 
management,  these results provided evidence that the internal control structure can 
be a tool the company to control the behavior of opportunities management in all 
conditions of the life cycle therefore it is important for companies to enforce the 
implementation of the structure of internal control in accordance with the needs of 
the company and confirms the auditor to perform auditing standards appropriately  
concerning the examination of internal control systems as a basis for determining 
the nature, timing and extent of tests audit. 
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WPŁYW CYKLI ŻYCIA FIRMY NA KSZTAŁTOWANIE WYNIKU 
ROZLICZEŃ MIĘDZYOKRESOWYCH Z SYSTEMEM KONTROLI 
WEWNĘTRZNEJ JAKO ZMIENNĄ MODERUJĄCĄ 
Streszczenie: Zarządzanie zyskami i cykle życia firmy są wciąż interesującym tematem do 
zbadania i omówienia, ponieważ w dużych firmach lokalnych i zagranicznych odnotowuje 
się wiele przypadków oszustw. Skandale finansowe dotyczące kierownictwa z roku na rok 
stają się coraz bardziej powszechne i ironią jest, że oszustwa popełniane były przez 
kierowników finansowych renomowanych firm. W niniejszym badaniu zbadano związek 
pomiędzy cyklami życia firmy w zakresie kształtowania wyniku rozliczeń 
międzyokresowych i przeanalizowano system kontroli wewnętrznej w celu złagodzenia 
relacji pomiędzy cyklami życia przedsiębiorstwa w zakresie kształtowania wyniku 
rozliczeń międzyokresowych. W badaniu wykorzystano panel 502 danych z indonezyjskiej 
giełdy kapitałowej z lat 2010 - 2014. Wynik badania: cykle życia firmy nie miały wpływu 
na kształtowanie wyniku rozliczeń międzyokresowych, ale system kontroli wewnętrznej 
mógł obniżyć pozytywny wpływ cykli życia firmy na kształtowanie wyniku finansowego. 
Słowa kluczowe: kształtowanie wyniku rozliczeń międzyokresowych, cykle życia firmy, 
system kontroli wewnętrznej 
公司生命週期對內部控制系統的價值管理與現代變化的影響 
摘要：收購管理和公司生命週期仍然有待研究和討論，因為當地大型企業和國外的
欺詐案例很多。管理層的財務醜聞被證明是增加的，這是一個諷刺，因為這些醜聞
是由有信譽的公司的財務經理承擔的。本研究審查了公司生命週期對應計利潤管理
的關係，並分析了內部控制制度，以緩解公司生命週期對應計利潤管理的關係。本
研究使用了2010年至2014年印度尼西亞資本證券交易所502個數據組。本研究的結果
：公司生命週期不影響應計利潤管理，但內部控制制度能夠降低公司生活的積極影
響循環盈餘管理。 
關鍵詞：應計盈餘管理，公司生命週期，內部控制制度 
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